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Successor liability is an exception to the general rule that, when
one corporate or other juridical person sells assets to another
entity, the assets are transferred free and clear of all but valid liens
and security interests. When successor liability is imposed, a creditor or plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert that claim
against and collect payment from the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine, designed to eliminate the harsh results that could attend strict application of corporate law. Over time, however, as successorliability doctrines evolved, they became, in many jurisdictions,
ossified and inflexible. As this occurred, corporate lawyers and
those who structure transactions learned how to avoid application of successor-liability doctrines.'
There are two broad groups of successor-liability doctrines:
those that are judge-made (the common-law exceptions) and
those that are creatures of statute. This article addresses the status
of the first group, judge-made successor liability in Michigan. Considering its roots as a reaction to the rise of corporate law in the
last half of the nineteenth century, it may be better to think of it
as part of corporate or contract law, much like the doctrines of
alter ego or piercing the corporate veil,2 rather than as a creature
of tort law.

The State of Successor Liability in Michigan
This article classifies judge-made successor liability into five general species, each of which is specifically defined on a jurisdictionby-jurisdiction basis. The five categories of successor liability discussed in this article are (1) intentional assumptions of liabilities,
(2) fraudulent schemes to escape liability, (3) de facto mergers,
(4) the continuity exceptions: mere continuation and continuity
of enterprise, and (5) the product-line exception. The label a court
uses for its test is not necessarily one with a standardized meaning applicable across jurisdictions. Accordingly, the underlying
substance should always be examined.

Intentional (Express or Implied)
Assumptions of Liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities, express or implied, is the
simplest of the successor-liability species. Imposing liability on
a successor that by its actions is shown to have assumed liabilities is essentially application of basic contract law doctrines
3
of construction.
Michigan recognizes express or implied assumption of liabilities as an exception to the general rule of successor nonliability.
On one occasion, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that,
when the facts and circumstances surrounding a purchase agreement as well as a deposition of the successor's vice president suggested the possibility of implied assumption, summary judgment
5
for the successor was inappropriate.

Fast Facts:
The five common law successor-liability doctrines
recognized in Michigan are express or implied
assumptions, fraudulent schemes to escape liability,
de facto mergers, and mere continuation and
continuity of enterprise.
The Foster Court made it clear that continuity of
enterprise liability required a showing of each of the
three Turner elements rather than a consideration
of these elements as optional or variable factors.
In Michigan, the availability of a predecessor as a
source of recovery for a plaintiff is fatal to actions
for successor liability; the doctrine of continuity
of enterprise applies only when the transferor is no
longer viable and capable of being sued.

Fraudulent Schemes to Escape Liability
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using corporate law
principles to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors illustrate
an example of the need for successor liability to prevent injustice.
If a corporation's equity holders, for example, arrange for the
company's assets to be sold to a new company in which they also
hold a stake for less value than would be produced if the assets
were deployed by the original company in the ordinary course of
business, then the legitimate interests and expectations of the
company's creditors have been frustrated. The challenge is separating the fraudulent scheme from the legitimate one.
The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a district court's application of the fraud exception in Gougeon Bros, Inc v Phoenix
Resins, Inc.6 In reviewing the district court's holding of successor
liability, the court stated:
The trial court held that plaintiff demonstrated that defendant was
subject to successor liability because the sale of [the predecessor's]
assets was a fraudulent transfer designed to defraud... creditors
and because defendant was a mere continuation of [the predecessor]. To support this holding, the court made the following
findings of fact: defendant bought [the assets for $3,000, while...
sales had exceeded $115,000; the same two persons were equal
shareholders of both [the predecessor] and defendant; defendant
conducts business at same address as did [the predecessor]; and
defendant notified [the predecessor] distributors that [an] epoxy
[product] was now one of defendant's products, that defendant
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would pay any currently owed invoices, and that the distributors
should continue to use [the predecessor's] literature until the new
These findings demonstrate, at least, that
literature was available ....
7
of [the predecessor].
continuation
defendant is a mere
Implicit in this holding is that the threshold for mere continuation liability, discussed later in this article, may be lower than
the threshold for fraud.

De Facto Mergers
In a statutory merger, the successor corporation becomes lia8
ble for the predecessor's debts. The de facto merger species of
successor liability creates the same result in the context of a sale
of assets to avoid allowing form to overcome substance. A de facto
merger, then, allows liability to attach when an asset sale has mimicked the results of a statutory merger except for the continuity of
liability. The main difference between the subspecies of de facto
merger in Various jurisdictions is how many required elements
must be shown to establish applicability of the doctrine.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Turner v Bituminous Cas
Co, while fashioning the continuity-of-enterprise exception,
quoted Shannon v Samuel Langston Co for the "requirements"
of de facto merger:
"1. There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations.
"2. There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares

of its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
"3. The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
"4. The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted con9
tinuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation."

Continuation of the Business:
The Continuity Exceptions
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor liability when the successor continues the business of the
seller. The subcategories are mere continuation and continuity of
enterprise. Each subcategory also has subspecies particular to
specific jurisdictions within them. The two subcategories share
roughly the same indications, but continuity of enterprise does
not require continuity of shareholders or directors or officers between the predecessor and the successor-a requirement said to
be one of the mere-continuation exception's dispositive elements
or factors. 10 Courts are not altogether careful or uniform in labeling which exception they are applying. There appear to be four
general subspecies of mere continuation and three of continuity
of enterprise. The similarity of these doctrines to those of de facto
merger is striking."
Mere Continuation
As noted by the dissent in Turner, the mere-continuation ex2
ception is "the most confused of the four exceptions." "IT]he
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exception seems to encompass the situation where one corporation sells its assets to another corporation with the same people owning both corporations." 13 Since Michigan has adopted
the broader continuity-of-enterprise doctrine, further discussion
of mere continuation has been rendered somewhat moot.
Continuity of Enterprise
Unlike the more traditional and longstanding mere-continuation
exception, the continuity-of-enterprise theory does not require
strict continuity of shareholders or owners (and possibly directors and officers) between the predecessor and the successoralthough the degree or extent of continuity of owners, directors,
14
and officers is a factor.
In Turner,the Michigan Supreme Court developed the continuityof-enterprise theory of successor liability, establishing three criteria that would be the threshold guidelines to establish whether
there is continuity of enterprise between the transferee and the
transferor corporations.15 These three criteria consist of elements
1, 3, and 4 from Shannon that Turner adopted for de facto mergers. They are:
"(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and general business operations;
"(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically
possible; and
"(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the interrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation." 6
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the limits of
the continuity-of- enterprise exception again until 1999 in Foster
v Cone-Blanchard Mach Co.17 In the interim, the Court cited
Turner in three decisions, none of which clarified the key Turner
holding.' One appellate court decision between Turner and
Fosteradded to the criteria a fourth consideration also stated
in Turner.9
The Foster Court made it clear that the continuity-of-enterprise
test consisted of the three required elements stated in the decision and that these were not to be treated as factors or considerations.20 Second, the Foster Court held that the "'continuity of
enterprise' doctrine applies only when the transferor is no longer
viable and capable of being sued."'" The Court's interpretation of
the underlying rationale of Turner was "to provide a source of
recovery for injured plaintiffs.'""
The Foster decision thus appears to have returned Michigan
law to its state immediately after Turner was decided: continuity
of enterprise is a recognized doctrine of successor liability, and
the doctrine has three required elements. To the extent that intervening decisions had narrowed Turner with the addition of a
fourth factor-whether the purchasing corporation holds itself

out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller corporation-that reformation of the doctrine appears to have been
reversed. Further, to the extent that Turner's "guidelines" had
been considered mere factors by other courts adopting the continuity of enterprise, the Foster Court made it clear that it interpreted its own rule as one composed of required elements.

The Product-Line Exception
of Ray v Alad Corp
Although not part of Michigan law, in Ray v Alad Corp,23 the
California Supreme Court recognized the product-line exception
to the general rule of successor nonliability. It is very similar to
continuity of enterprise. The court articulated the following "justifications" for imposing liability on a successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the
business, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that
was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's
goodwill being enjoyed by the successor in the continued opera24
tion of the business.
The term "justifications" is somewhat ambiguous with regard
to whether it connotes required elements or nonexclusive factors
to be balanced, much like the Turner guidelines.
The California Supreme Court returned to Ray some years later
to "clarify" things in Henkel Corp v HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co.2 5 There, the court referred to these three justifications as
"conditions," suggesting that they were essential elements under
the product-line exception.26 Despite its name, the product-line
theory of successor liability appears only rarely, if at all, to have
been applied in a reported decision to a successor that had acquired merely one of many product lines from the predecessor; in
nearly all reported cases, it appears to have been applied to sales

Fraudulent schemes to escape liability
by using corporate law principles to
defeat the legitimate interests of creditors
illustrate an example of the need for
successor liability to prevent injustice.
The challenge is separating the fraudulent
scheme from the legitimate one.
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of substantially all of a predecessor's assets. In fact, one court
has emphasized that the "policy justifications for our adopting
the product line rule require the transfer of substantially all of the
28
predecessor's assets to the successor corporation."
Michigan courts have not adopted the product-line doctrine. S

George W Kuney is a WP. Tomsprofessor oflaw and director ofthe Clayton Centerfor EntrepreneurialLaw at The University of Tennessee College
ofLaw. He is the author ofa number of books, law review, and other articles dealing with business, contracts, Chapter 11, and insolvency issues. See
www.law.utk.edu/FACULTY/FACULTYkuney. htm.
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